From Justice to Care: Envisioning Technology's Role in Offline Misinformation Correction

Lauren Scott
Northumbria University
Newcastle upon Tyne
United Kingdom
lauren8.scott@northumbria.ac.uk

Jamie Mahoney
Northumbria University
Newcastle upon Tyne
United Kingdom
jamie.mahoney@northumbria.ac.uk

David Colborn-Clark
Northumbria University
Newcastle upon Tyne
United Kingdom
david.colbornclark@northumbria.ac.uk

Reem Talhouk
Northumbria University
Newcastle upon Tyne
United Kingdom
reem.talhouk@northumbria.ac.uk

The offline spread of misinformation remains largely overlooked in HCI research, despite a documented role in real-world harms. This paper situates the problem in urban environments, where existing technological infrastructures offer potential for large-scale intervention. Using a speculative co-design approach, we ran workshops asking participants to envision futures in which urban technologies detect and respond to the offline spread of false information. Using Activity Theory as an analytical lens, we identify two roles that participants envisioned technology taking in this context: mediating justice; and mediating care-giving. We discuss the additional challenges an offline, urban setting brings to false information tracking.

false information, misinformation, disinformation, speculative design, urban

1. INTRODUCTION

Misinformation is a large-scale issue that impacts the UK economically and socially. Social media echo chambers are often blamed, but the offline spread of misinformation is largely overlooked.

Most research that tries to combat misinformation spread focusses on online environments, or interpersonal conversations with close ties (Scott et al. 2023); but not the spread of misinformation offline. To explore this, we have utilised a speculative co-design approach with three workshops (n=11) to explore speculative technologies to combat misinformation spread. We have situated this work within an urban environment, as there are existing surveillance and governance infrastructure used for public safety and crime prevention; posing the following research question: **How do members of the public perceive speculative public-space interventions designed to interrupt person-to-person misinformation spread in cities?**

Through this work, we contribute the following:

- An application of Activity Theory to misinformation spread in urban environments
- An account of how the public perceives potential future misinformation surveillance systems for urban environments and the infrastructure around them.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. The Challenge of False Information

False information proliferates through online and offline social networks, causing significant societal impact across health (Vidgen et al. 2021; Bautista et al. 2021), political decision making (Haigh et al. 2018), and public safety (Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan 2025). The majority of research remains focused on online contexts (Cacciatore 2021), with offline spread consistently overlooked (Altay et al. 2023) despite its known role in real-world violence and unrest (Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan 2025; Scott et al. 2025).

© Scott et al. Published by BCS Learning and Development Ltd.

2.2. Urban environments as intervention sites

To address false information spread at scale, we focus on urban environments, which offer existing infrastructure, governance structures, and wide-reaching public presence. Urban informatics has been leveraged to address diverse civic challenges (Foth et al. 2011; Colley et al. 2023; Johnson et al. 2018), but challenges around privacy in public interactions exist (Schroeter 2012).

2.3. Activity Theory as a framework

Activity Theory(Engeström 1999) provides a framework for exploring the goals and actions of individuals within changing real-world contexts (Dix et al. 2004; Rogers 2012). Its unit of analysis is an activity directed towards an object, conducted within a social matrix of people and artefacts (Kaptelinin and Nardi 1997). Key actors include the subject, rules, community, tools, division of labour, and objective, all of which interconnect within an activity system.

Scott (2025) has used Activity Theory in misinformation work to explore the interactions between spreader and recipient in an close-tie relationship, providing the groundwork to use Activity Theory in this setting. Their work broke down the roles of spreader, recipient and external actor(s) in misinformation correction interactions to explore their social norms and resources they utilised; using Activity theory to show how the roles interplay with one another, all being essential elements to these interactions (Scott 2025). We use activity to look at the wider infrastructure that can support misinformation correction in Urban spaces, with a wider lens than just peer-to-peer correction. As Urban spaces bring together community (inhabitants), rules (laws/governance), division of labour (intersection between public governance and individual responsibilities), and tools (technologies explored in this work); we selected this as the theoretical framing of this work. We specifically explore **division of labour** in this work, exploring who or what does the work of correction, to support the other roles within the activity of misinformation correction.

3. METHODS

The research adopts a speculative co-design approach (Harrington and Dillahunt 2021), utilising design workshops, where participants (n=11) were encouraged to co-design futures that they envisioned and in doing so explore their perceptions of the future use of urban digital technologies in response to the offline spread of false information. The research obtained ethical approval from Northumbria University.

3.1. Recruitment

Participants were recruited via posters around Newcastle upon Tyne city centre, UK, and were eligible if they lived in or frequently travelled into the area. Workshops took place in May 2025, face-to-face at Northumbria University. Informed consent was obtained and participants were remunerated with a £25 gift voucher. Ages ranged from 18-74 and participants held qualifications from NVQ Level 3 to Doctorate. Workshop discussions were audio-recorded and outputs generated by participants were collected (see Appendices). To facilitate the anonymisation of data, participants selected an animal alias to use during the workshop, and are referred to by this alias in this work.

3.2. Workshop Materials

The workshop materials (included in the supplementary materials) consisted of an A3 worksheet with a storyboard space, a deck of persona cards (generated based on Newcastle Upon Tyne city centre, UKcensus data), a deck of location cards (in Newcastle Upon Tyne city centre, UK), a deck of topic cards (environmental, political, health), a deck of role cards, and a deck of technology cards. We refrained from providing specific examples of false information, as it would not be ethical to potentially misinform participants during the workshop. Role cards were created based upon previously identified roles within research on the spread of false information (Scott et al. 2025). The roles included: accidental spreader, intentional spreader, conflict avoidant receiver, face-to-face challenger, and digital challenger.

The technologies card deck consisted of technologies often used in urban spaces (e.g., cameras), and participants could create new cards. Personal devices such as smartphones and smartwatches were excluded, to encourage community-wide rather than individual responses.

3.2.1. Tasks

During each workshop, participants were asked to complete a series of four tasks, with two members of the research team supporting the process.

Task 1- Participants were first asked to describe a piece of false information they had previously heard; this was intended as an ice-breaker exercise and was not included as data for the analysis.

Task 2 - Participants were given persona, role, topic, and location cards, and asked to create a four-step structured scenario in which their persona encountered false information. Recipient-role scenarios followed: (a) exposure, (b) processing, (c) response, (d) aftermath; spreader-role scenarios followed an analogous structure (spread, response, aftermath).

After completing their structured scenario (shown in Appendix A), groups were asked to share them with the wider room, thus facilitating discussions between the groups.

Task 3 - Participants were offered the deck of technology cards, and were asked to look at this deck and consider the different technologies that could be used to intervene/spot/support persona when they encounter false information. Participants were not instructed to design utopian or dystopian futures. The task asked them to consider technologies that could intervene, spot or support a persona encountering false information, without steering the tone of the outcome.

Task 4 - Participants were asked to share their scenarios with the room, this was followed by a discussion on the ethical and societal concerns that may arise within and across their scenarios and the technologies used.

3.3. Data Analysis

Each design workshop was audio recorded and transcribed by the third author with assistance from Microsoft's automated AI-powered transcription. Transcripts were then anonymised to remove names, locations and any other identifiable information. Following Braun and Clarke's (2021) inductive thematic analysis, the first and last authors familiarised themselves with the transcripts before independently coding, meeting to sense-check an initial transcript and refine codes together. Codes were grouped into three candidate themes: involvement of actors, urban environments, and role of technology which were later reduced to the two reported here with the second author.

4. FINDINGS

As this work focusses on the Division of Labour element of Activity Theory, in this paper we report the findings relating to this element. From our thematic analysis we report two themes relating to this, which capture the roles through which this division of labour could take place: Mediating Justice, and Mediating Care-giving and Support Systems. In addition, when presenting these roles, we also draw out through the data some of the different actors and infrastructures that would be at play in each role.

4.1. Mediating Justice (Role One)

Some participants saw a need for justice in response to false information spread, understood not as wider social or global justice, but within the existing institutionalised judicial system, with acts of judgment and punishment present in participants' designs. Technology held the role of a tool for actors within this system, such as police, gathering evidence for a human judge or judging false information directly and enacting punishment. Additionally, participants discussed challenges in establishing information credibility, especially in differentiating between opinion and fact, and whose role that would be.

4.1.1. Detecting and Policing

Participants brought forward futures in which technologies play a role in policing the spread of false information within urban spaces.

In one instance, a siren, which they referred to as the "*bullshit alarm*" (Horse), would start when detecting the spread of offline false information. The siren would not only publicly shame the spreader, but would also prompt a robot to take away the spreader: "*so i also like have the robots basically come and chuck him [the taxi driver] out.*" (Dinosaur).

In comparison to the use of technologies to police spreaders of false information, one group viewed technologies as tools for gathering evidence to be used within the judicial system.

Tiger and Rabbit recounted how the face-to-face challenger would use their mobile phone to record the false information being spread and how the spreader responds to being challenged about it: "*like to capture the situations in the scenario*" (Rabbit)

In addition, given that in their speculative scenario the spreader of false information was the coffee shop and by proxy the coffee shop manager, they would be able to give the police access to use the shop's CCTV footage for evidence within a judicial process.Participants debated tensions around privately owned technologies operating in public spaces, suggesting local authorities may need jurisdiction to access footage for evidence gathering, potentially using AI detection systems to assess whether a spreader responded appropriately when challenged.

4.1.2. Mediating what is fact

While three of the participant groups emphasised the potential role for technology in enacting justice, participants across all four groups questioned how said justice is reliant on the accurate determination of whether it is false information being spread.

A key challenge with false information is determining and/or communicating the truth. Participants described, in a future where false information interventions were present within urban spaces, it would be difficult to both tell "*what's difference of*

opinion... that's not necessarily misinformation." (Octopus), and to balance "*objectivity... with personal liberty*" (Dog). they further compounded this challenge with an inability to have intentionally inaccurate or nonsensical conversations in futures where these interventions are present:"*let's say that my friend and I are talking about a movie that has some flying cars, then there's an alert that says this is misinformation"* (Octopus)

In addition, participants brought to the fore how conversations challenging false information may still not end up with a shared truth: "*With those challenging conversations the end result is not necessarily let's agree on what's true... and sometimes it's not necessarily stuff that's 100% false, just stuff that is misrepresented in a particular context*" (Koala)

Participants also discussed how different topics may have objective facts (e.g., health information), whereas some (e.g., political information) may be more intrinsically based on belief/opinion. A challenge with this being that participants held an assumed level of due diligence for their recipient, taking their actions as fact checkers as a given; with most storyboards featuring a fact-checking stage:"*[she] check[ed] the NHS website because she's skeptical, she wants some confirmation*" (Koala).

4.1.3. Mediating Judgement
Participants also discussed the actors that may be involved in delivering judgement, ranging from the "*city council*" (Octopus) to national healthcare bodies and international judges.

However, they discussed how trust in the actors behind a system would impact the use of said system stating that "*it depends who's behind the system*" (Octopus) and that members of the public's political allegiance could impact trust in the system.

The perceived legitimacy of actors was also relevant when considering their role in passing judgment as part of the interventions. In their storyboard Tiger and Rabbit were of the opinion that it is necessary for the judge to be human as that would provide a form of legitimacy which they did not perceive as a characteristic of decision-making AI: "*we need legitimacy because sometimes they [AI technologies] don't*" (Tiger)

They also indicated that interventions that pass judgment may require the oversight of neutral third parties. This neutral third party would likely need to be an actor with international powers that can work across countries that have different regulations regarding the spread of false information.

Participants also viewed the public itself as an actor with the power to judge spreaders of false information.

4.2. Mediating Care-giving and Support Systems (Role Two)

Here, we use care-giving to refer to a supportive, non-punitive role, one focused on helping a person process, verify or recover from exposure to false information, rather than assigning blame or enacting consequences. This sits in contrast to the judicial role discussed in 4.1, and does not map onto formal or clinical care-giving. Different actors held caregiver and support roles across the storyboards. Technology often took on a patriarchal caregiver role, surveying recipients and providing support, while human third parties played a similar role, helping recipients rehearse challenges and validating their questioning of the information. Similarly, participants also speculated that technology could take a supporting role as the recipient's personal assistant, with participants unable to foresee a future without their smartphones.

4.2.1. Mediating the support of human actors
Regardless of the use of technologies, participants viewed the support of human actors to be valuable to those exposed to false information. Within the human-human dyad, participants highlighted how people may not be able to "*have a sensible conversation and still be friends afterwards*" (Dog).. That being said, participants indicated that personas might want to *"take that [false information] in and maybe end up then discussing [it with] their friends yeah like like rather than maybe directly approaching these people"* (Dog). In addition, personas with the role of face-to-face challengers might want to rehearse what they will say to the spreader of false information with a friend prior to challenging the false information.

Participants viewed that technologies may play a role in mediating this human-human support. For example, in one instance it was suggested that the persona may share a video of the incident of challenging the false information online to seek validation and support from members of the public:"*you know posting [on] the social media and they'll tell make a like narrative story about what happens in about her experience in coffee shop*" (Rabbit)

4.2.2. Mediating Care-giving
Our analysis showed that technologies can play a role in the mediation of the state providing education as a form of care-giving.

For example, participants highlighted that state-based institutions may use technologies to detect

the spread of false information and respond with corrective information: "*if the council is getting lots of reports on people confused about certain topics they can put out information to clarify things*" (Octopus).

In another storyboard, the spreader of false information was taken by the robot police and placed in a re-education centre, where education was provided to him to stop the future spread of false information.

Despite this care-giving role, some participants did highlight that such forms of re-education may contribute to future radicalisation, likening the re-education centres to prisons:"*or he gets like erm, what's the word? where people get more extreme in their views, radicalised*" (Dinosaur).

4.2.3. Technology as an assistant
Although participants mainly focused on shared urban technologies, they also discussed the role that phones and online tools and platforms could have in supporting recipients/spreader in establishing whether something is fact or opinion, and being used to provide "*a location-based summary [of corrective information*]" (Dog).

Participants considered recipient's/spreader's own approaches to determining credibility of information upon being exposed to new information: "*he searched it [whether it was false information or not] in the library [on his phone]*" (Duck).

However, similar to previous findings, when using technology for assistance in identifying correct information, the discussions among participants circled back to trust in the sources of information: "*people will be split down the middle if they trust the information [provided by a chatbot run by the city council] or not, depending on if they like or don't like the council*" (Jellyfish).

5. DISCUSSION

Through this analysis we have dived deep into how division of labour was represented in our participants' discussions about urban misinformation tracking/correction. However, there were also a number of considerations that came out of discussions regarding the rules and community that would be part of this activity. In this discussion, we unpack the division of labour, rules, and community elements of the activity of addressing the offline spread of false information by discussing first the roles and tensions we have uncovered in this work (Division of Labour), what infrastructure and related governance (Rules) would need to be in place for these interventions to work, and finally who participants see being involved in this infrastructure (Community). In this section, we discuss these elements in relation to relevant academic literature.

5.1. Division of Labour - The roles and tensions we have uncovered in this work

Our thematic analysis uncovered two roles through which technology could divide the labour of offline misinformation correction: a judicial role in policing false information spread, and a caring role assisting the recipient with their experiences and reactions to the spread.

Related work also shows individuals turning to online social media groups to get validation of their beliefs (Scott et al. 2025); and turning to those around them for care and support during these interactions (Scott et al. 2023). However, in this work, we see technology holding these supportive roles - taking on the role of a caregiver in these interactions. This directly counters the role that individuals **currently** want technology to have in their decision making, which is no role at all; research shows that individuals do not want technology having an impact on their decision making when it comes to false information (Scott et al. 2026).

We consider the main takeaways relating to **Division of Labour** in urban misinformation correction to be: (a) Individuals see technology involved in track misinformation has having a supportive role - as a decision-making aid, evidence gathering tool, or caregiver/educator, and (b) Individuals see technology's role as requiring human oversight, not making final decisions about misinformation or punishment.

Many of the technologies participants designed, including punitive robots, re-education centres, and public shaming alarms, read as dystopian rather than aspirational, despite participants not being asked to design dystopias. This points to an underlying association between "solving" misinformation and control, one that designers and policymakers should treat with caution rather than as public endorsement of these approaches.

5.2. Rules - What infrastructure would need to be in place for these interventions to work

Participants discussed how existing rules, laws, and governance would shape these systems. Ownership was a key concern: the mixed public-private landscape of urban spaces affects who can access correction-relevant data, echoing Qiao et al.'s argument for digital data intermediaries bridging community and processed datasets (Qiao et al. 2025). Furthermore, there is a challenge in the balance between what is opinion and what is fact–as participants indicated this is a challenge across the

range of types of information whether it be health-related or conversational speculation taking place in public space, with the challenge being exacerbated by the recent scaling back of independent fact checkers online (Glauser 2026).

We consider the main takeaways relating to **rules** in urban misinformation correction to be: (a) Individuals see challenges in ownership and access to technologies due to private/public ownership dichotomy of urban spaces, and (b) Individuals feel laws and infrastructure would be needed to support these interventions, to establish a unified view of fact and opinion.

5.3. Community - Who do participants see involved in this infrastructure

In this work our participants identified different organisations, actors and individuals who would be involved in urban false information correction, external to the recipient and spreader. These individuals ranged from friends/family members close to the recipient, to private business owners in the city centre, to local authorities/city councils, the police, and international powers as overseers of these systems. Although individuals taking on the role as peer-to-peer support systems is not new (Scott et al. 2023), little research considers wider online and offline infrastructure that supports these interactions; other than the role of a social media platform and in outlining these bodies, privacy was a recurring concern of participants.

Privacy concerns expressed by participants around offline misinformation interventions (such as concerns about constant audio recording) mirror those seen in online and urban technology contexts (e.g. public display interventions (Schroeter 2012)), where tensions exist between correction, autonomy, and surveillance. Participants in this study viewed privacy as a civic challenge, notably accepting surveillance-style interventions in public spaces due to existing familiarity with CCTV for public safety. This aligns with Lu et al.'s finding that security-oriented communities are more receptive to surveillance technologies (Lu et al. 2023), suggesting that tackling offline misinformation may increasingly be framed through a security lens.

We consider the main takeaways relating to **Community** in urban misinformation correction to be: (a) Individuals see offline misinformation correction as linked to existing judicial systems, in determining spread and enacting punishment, and (b) Where information is shared between actors, privacy needs to be considered, enabling collaboration whilst keeping it at the forefront.

Our sample was drawn from a single UK city centre with dense existing surveillance infrastructure (CCTV, council-run public spaces), which participants leaned on as ready-made scaffolding for their imagined systems rather than proposing new infrastructure from scratch. This suggests urban environments bring their own inherited legitimacy to speculative interventions, and that residents of lower-density areas, without the same CCTV coverage or council presence, may be less inclined to accept surveillance-style interventions as normal or may propose different infrastructure altogether. Future work should compare urban, suburban, and rural publics directly, and test whether interventions framed as extensions of existing infrastructure face less resistance than those framed as new, purpose-built systems.

6. LIMITATIONS

As exploratory work, there are limitations worth acknowledging. The participant sample was small (n=11) and skewed towards academic and research roles, and was recruited from a single UK city, which may limit transferability of findings to other publics and urban contexts.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This paper explored public perceptions of urban technologies for addressing the offline spread of false information, an under-explored problem despite its real-world consequences. Speculative co-design workshops surfaced two roles participants envisioned for technology, mediating justice and mediating care-giving, alongside concerns about who owns the infrastructure, who determines what is false, and how privacy can be maintained. These findings point to the need for greater interdisciplinarity in pursuing offline misinformation interventions responsibly, and offer an early step towards understanding how publics imagine the futures we might build.

Acknowledgements
This work was supported by funding from Northumbria Urban Futures' 2024/5 seedcorn funding opportunity. We would like to thank our funders, and our visiting student workers from Purdue University and Indiana University Luddy who contributed to the work by creating the graphical interpretations of storyboards created by participants within this study. So thank you to Allison Mau, Ria Sambasivan, Molly Koers, and Aman Mulchandani; as well as their mentors, Austin Toombs, Colin M. Gray and Paul Parsons.

REFERENCES

Altay, S., M. Berriche, and A. Acerbi (2023, January). Misinformation on Misinformation: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges. *Social Media + Society 9*(1), 20563051221150412. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Bautista, J. R., Y. Zhang, and J. Gwizdka (2021, April). Healthcare professionals' acts of correcting health misinformation on social media. *International Journal of Medical Informatics 148*, 104375.

Braun, V. and V. Clarke (2021, October). *Thematic Analysis: A Practical Guide* (1st edition ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Cacciatore, M. A. (2021, April). Misinformation and public opinion of science and health: Approaches, findings, and future directions. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118*(15), e1912437117.

Colley, M., L.-M. Meinhardt, A. Fassbender, M. Rietzler, and E. Rukzio (2023, June). Come fly with me: Investigating the effects of path visualizations in automated urban air mobility. *Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol. 7*(2).

Dix, A., J. Finlay, G. B. Abowd, and R. Beale (2004). Ubiquitous computing and augmented realities. In *Human-Computer Interaction*, pp. 717–747. England: Pearson Education.

Engeström, Y. (1999). Activity theory and individual. *Perspectives on activity theory 19*.

Foth, M., J. H.-j. Choi, and C. Satchell (2011). Urban informatics. In *Proceedings of the ACM 2011 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work*, CSCW '11, New York, NY, USA, pp. 1–8. Association for Computing Machinery.

Glauser, W. (2026). As social media scales back fact-checking, can technologies fill the gap?

Haigh, M., T. Haigh, and N. I. Kozak (2018, October). Stopping Fake News: The work practices of peer-to-peer counter propaganda. *Journalism Studies 19*(14), 2062–2087.

Harrington, C. and T. R. Dillahunt (2021). Eliciting tech futures among black young adults: A case study of remote speculative co-design. In *Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, CHI '21, New York, NY, USA. Association for Computing Machinery.

Johnson, I. G., A. Puussaar, J. Manuel, and P. Wright (2018, November). Neighbourhood data: Exploring the role of open data in locally devolved policymaking processes. *Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact. 2*(CSCW).

Kaptelinin, V. and B. A. Nardi (1997). Activity theory: Basic concepts and applications. In *CHI'97 extended abstracts on human factors in computing systems*, pp. 158–159.

Lu, A. J., S. Sannon, C. Moy, S. Brewer, J. Green, K. N. Jackson, D. Reeder, C. Wafer, M. S. Ackerman, and T. R. Dillahunt (2023). Shifting from surveillance-as-safety to safety-through-noticing: A photovoice study with eastside detroit residents. In *Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, CHI '23, New York, NY, USA. Association for Computing Machinery.

Qiao, H., S. Wu, and C. Becker (2025, May). "near data" and "far data" for urban sustainability: How do community advocates envision data intermediaries? *Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact. 9*(2).

Rogers, Y. (2012). *HCI Theory: Classical, Modern, and Contemporary*. Morgan & Claypool Publishers. Google-Books-ID: mWslB7KDfXIC.

Schroeter, R. (2012). Engaging new digital locals with interactive urban screens to collaboratively improve the city. In *Proceedings of the ACM 2012 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work*, CSCW '12, New York, NY, USA, pp. 227–236. Association for Computing Machinery.

Scott, L. (2025, February). *Misinformation, communication, and challenges: how technology can be used to support misinformation correction within UK family networks*. Doctor of Philosophy, Northumbria University, Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.

Scott, L., L. Coventry, M. E. Cecchinato, and M. Warner (2023, April). "I figured her feeling a little bit bad was worth it to not spread that kind of hate": Exploring how UK families discuss and challenge misinformation. In *Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, CHI '23, New York, NY, USA, pp. 1–15. Association for Computing Machinery.

Scott, L., M. Warner, and M. E. Cecchinato (2026). Using Speculative Design to Explore Technology-Facilitated Misinformation Correction. In *Reports of the European Society for Socially Embedded Technologies*.

Scott, L., M. Warner, L. Coventry, and M. E. Cecchinato (2025). Accidental Spreaders: How Different Roles Interact During Misinformation Discussions. European Society for Socially

Embedded Technologies (EUSSET). ISSN: 2510-2591.

Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan (2025). From Disinformation to Violence: The UK Far Right and 2024 Riots. *Counter Terrorist Trends & Analyses 17*(2).

Vidgen, B., H. Taylor, M. Pantazi, Z. Anastasiou, B. Inkster, and H. Margetts (2021, March). Understanding vulnerability to online misinformation. Technical report, The Alan Turing Institute.

A. PARTICIPANTS' STORYBOARDS (PRE-INTERVENTION)



Figure 1: *The storyboards created by participants showing false information exposure and consequences*

B. PARTICIPANTS' STORYBOARDS (POST-INTERVENTION)



Figure 2: *The storyboards created by participants showing technology interventions in context*